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1. Introduction 
The new context of knowledge-based economy has important implications for companies 
operating in “pure subcontracting industries”
2
 (Hätönen and Eriksson 2009). Nowadays, 
subcontractors are not only required to simply produce but are often urged to generate the 
technological knowledge which fuels new product and process development. Since the early 
90s, a growing body of research has endeavored to describe this new “collaborative 
outsourcing mode” based on interdependent and long-term relationships (Cohendet and 
Llerena 2005; Baudry 2004, Takeishi 2002; Amesse et al. 2001; Nonaka and Takeichi 1995). 
Quite surprisingly, there are very few empirical studies which provide direct information on 
innovation and technology transfer capabilities of subcontractors associated to this new mode 
(Takeishi 2002). In this paper, we would like to assess to what extent “talented suppliers” 
(Smith and Transfield 2005) that are placed in collaborative relationships might be more 
innovative or at least more actively involved in innovation than traditional subcontractors.  
 Besides, we know very little about the type of innovation (process and/or product) 
although this may be a key aspect to better understand the firms’ competitive position (Weiss, 
2003). The special attention given to the possible interaction between product and process 
innovations makes this study different from other studies that focus only on product 
innovation or sometimes on process innovation. 
To assess the full impact of the type of subcontracting relationships on the ability of a 
subcontractor to innovate in process and product, we first specify two types of subcontractors 
according to the nature of their subcontracting agreements, their inter-organizational practices 
and tools, and their absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Secondly, we measure 
this impact according to the type of subcontractors’ innovation (process and/or product). By 
following the Oslo Manual (OECD 2005), we define innovation in a comprehensive way at 
2 Pure subcontracting industries are considered those in which 80% of the turnover derives from subcontracting 
activity (Sessi 2007). These industries are not delineated according to a sectoral base (nature of the final output) 
but to a destination base (volume of the collected activity).  
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the decision making level of the firm. There will be innovation when the firm has introduced a 
substantially improved or completely new product and/or process in the last three years 
(2004-2006).  
The empirical analysis is based on data collected from subcontracting firms in May 2007. 
All firms were operating in “pure subcontracting industries”. They are by nature quasi-firms 
insofar as they depend more or less on other firms. Pure subcontracting industries are also 
made up of a large number of small independent companies which operate in traditional or 
low-tech activities (Sessi 2007). The study was conducted in one of the biggest industrial 
subcontracting regions in France: the “Sillon Alpin”.  
By estimating a bivariate probit model we have made several advances. Firstly, in line with 
previous empirical studies, results show that process and product innovations are not 
independent. Secondly, the test confirms the positive impact of a collaborative outsourcing 
agreement on the subcontractor’s probability to innovate whatever the type of innovation. 
Finally, we give evidence that product and process innovations are associated with 
differentiated inter-organizational practices and tools and distinctive absorptive capabilities.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical foundations of the 
research; Section 3 sets out the empirical procedure and describes the dataset; Section 4 
discusses the empirical results. In Section 5 we conclude with several theoretical implications 
and primary conclusions for policy makers.   
 
2. Innovation in subcontracting firms  
Studying subcontracting is difficult since it has been defined, elaborated and used differently. 
Technology transfer literature considers subcontracting as an asymmetric inter-firm 
relationship. Marketing and purchasing literature focuses on subcontracting as partnering in 
the context of single development projects. The concept itself remains multi-faceted and 
 4 
heterogeneous (Amesse et al. 2000): it is linked with opportunism and capabilities dimensions 
(MacIvor 2009) and distinct levels of analysis (the interfirm relationship as a whole versus the 
single development project). Moreover, the primary concern of most studies is to analyze 
subcontracting from the point of view of contractors, neglecting the suppliers’ innovation 
performance (Nobeoka et al., 2002). In order to have a more integral framework, we consider 
transaction-based and knowledge-based approaches of the firm. This allows us to distinguish 
traditional subcontracting from collaborative outsourcing and understand their potential 
impact on subcontractors’ innovation (2.1). Then, we clarify the “true” impact of 
subcontracting relationships by differentiating product and process innovations, taking into 
consideration their possible interaction (2.2). 
 
2.1. Subcontracting relationships and innovation 
In transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985 1999), subcontracting is merely a practice driven 
by cost reduction. This does not mean that there is no room for knowledge creation or 
innovation but these processes are a by-product of the division of labor (Williamson 1999). 
According to Baudry (2003), two types of “traditional” subcontractors can be identified: 
subcontractors of economy and subcontractors of specialization
3
, which differ mainly by their 
degree of dependence and the uncertainty level of their relationship. However, both share the 
same objective of producing goods and services under the guidance of large firms according 
to detailed knowledge specifications. Traditional subcontractors produce peripheral products 
that do not involve specific assets. This makes it more cost effective for a contractor to 
outsource if market incentives can be maintained and bureaucratic distortion avoided. The 
challenge for the contractor is to avoid a situation of capacity dependence. Subcontracting 
3
 Used to making a product itself, a firm exceptionally delegates this particular production to a subcontractor of 
economy because of temporary overloading or technical failure. In contrast, whenever a firm, because of its own 
strategy, does not intend to master a specific part of the industrial process, it will then call for a specialized 
subcontractor. The latter is selected using double criteria of know-how and technical equipment (Sessi, 2007). 
 
 5 
                                                 
relationships are therefore based on arm’s length contracts which are uncertain by nature and 
dependent on the subcontractor’s performance. Furthermore, the degree of interdependence is 
generally low because the activities in question are peripheral. In this way, transaction cost 
theory is useful to describe non innovative or less innovative subcontracting firms : “in terms 
of technology transfer, what is at stake in this zone (of quasi-market relations) is the exchange 
of artefacts, rather than innovative ideas or new tacit knowledge” (Cohendet and Llerena 
2005, pp. 182-183). In most cases, subcontractors are rarely in charge of product design, 
which is too specific or risky to be subcontracted. Thus, if we consider the nature of this inter-
firm relationship, subcontractors have no incentive to innovate in process or product. 
Nevertheless, subcontractors might be able to improve their processes because of passive 
learning effects. 
  
In contrast, the knowledge-based approach views subcontractors as “talented suppliers” 
(Smith and Transfield 2005) endowed with a new role in knowledge creation. Subcontracting 
relations are derived from the needs of contractors to access the complementary knowledge 
required to make their own skills valuable. Subcontractors contribute to building the 
knowledge base of their client and benefit from their accumulated absorptive capabilities 
(Nobeoka et al. 2002). Since the learning process is intrinsically social and collective (Nelson 
and Winter 1982), it occurs not only through imitation, but also because of joint contributions 
to the understanding of complex problems based on relational long term-contracts and 
coordinative routines. Compared to arm’s length market contracts, such arrangements are 
more structured, involve constant interaction between firms, more open information channels, 
greater trust and put less emphasis on price (Teece 1996). Similarly, Van Echtelt et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that suppliers’ involvement in product development is more effective when close 
relationships are adopted. Long term benefits will depend on the ability of the contractor to 
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manage a process along which learning routines are built to ensure that the capacity sets of 
both parties are aligned and remain useful for future projects. Since the relationship can be 
close but adversarial, Nobeoka et al. (2002) find that it is important to distinguish between the 
scope and the degree of inter-firm cooperation, rather than simply assume that “the fewer the 
customers the more cooperative the inter-firm relationship” (p.730). They show that suppliers 
that cultivate highly cooperative relationships with multiple customers can benefit from more 
learning opportunities than suppliers with fewer customers. Here, two main arguments should 
be retained.  
The first concerns the type of contractual agreement, which in the case of collaborative 
outsourcing is not a matter of dependence but of co-specialization (Teece 1996). Contractual 
mechanisms have to guarantee incentives for innovation. The length of the contract (mid/long 
term) and its explicit nature becomes a guarantee if compared to a short-term open, repetitive 
order, which characterizes traditional subcontracting. Then, subcontractors will be encouraged 
to innovate in order to reap future gains and benefit from the renewal of the contract to enjoy 
the fruits of the quasi-rent. The second argument relates to the weakness of the contractual 
dimension to qualify the full potential of subcontracting relationships. The knowledge-based 
approach to subcontracting is comparable to a process that depends both on the type of 
agreement and the quality of interaction between the contractor and subcontractor. To transfer 
and share knowledge, it is necessary to build routines as well as incentive schemes and 
information-sharing rules (Blumenberg et al. 2009). From this perspective, characterization 
must include inter-organizational practices and tools and absorptive capabilities of firms.  
To guarantee the integration of activities and flow of knowledge between subcontractors 
and contractors, two types of practices and tools can be considered as determinants of the 
innovation learning process. The first are practices dedicated to the coordination of quality, 
such as insurance-quality procedures, just-in-time or lean supply (Baudry 2003). Since the 
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outcome of the exchange is difficult to predict, these practices are necessary to make sure that 
a product or process will meet quality requirements. They also facilitate the renewal of 
contracts and promote the subcontractor’s technological potential. Baudry (1995) shows that 
the closest subcontractors use coordination mechanisms that “are no longer reduced to price 
mechanisms but require practices and tools that reveal the ability of a subcontractor to 
deliver goods in due quality and time and to innovate” (p. 106). Studying the case of the lean 
supply model, Lamming (1993) suggests that these new practices and tools foster the ability 
of the subcontractor to innovate. Secondly, logistical integration tools, such as Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) or Enterprise Resource Planning software (ERP) have become strategic in 
the development of new forms of subcontracting that include the sharing and diffusion of 
knowledge (Raymond and Blili 1997). EDI help share data and applications (such as ERP) 
among users in different organizations (Iacovou Charalambos et al. 1995). EDI is often 
conducted over propriety value-added networks and controlled by one large firm
4
 (Zhu 2002). 
Studying ICT adoption modes of French industrial firms, Bocquet and Brossard (2007) show 
distinct behavior which leads some firms to select network-oriented ICT equipment (EDI) or 
software-oriented ICT equipment (ERP) while others prefer to adopt both types of ICT (EDI 
and ERP). The presence of an EDI can be interpreted as the signal of a network organization 
in which a “hub” firm decentralizes activities to subcontracting firms (Raymond and Blili 
1997). Andersen (1999) has shown that EDI use depends on the subcontracting type. On the 
basis of 445 subcontractors in the Danish industry, he gives evidence that development-
oriented subcontractors (in both product and process) are more likely to use EDI than other 
traditional subcontractors. 
4
 New tools such as Webedifacts may change the Propriety issue since the initial cost load is much less than it 
used to be in the EDI-days. However, Bocquet and Brossard (2008) show that industrial firms in the Sillon Alpin 
are late adopters in matters concerning EDI: with an adoption rate far lower than the national average, these 
subcontractors should not be concerned by this new kind of tool. 
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The knowledge-based literature considers the subcontractors’ absorptive capacity as a key 
factor for successful partnership. The absorptive capacity of firms, defined as their ability to 
absorb outside knowledge, reflects the cumulative nature of knowledge which is largely a 
function of prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In the case of collaborative 
outsourcing, a supplier’s absorptive capacity is seen as a pre-requisite to building the 
contractors’ knowledge base. But, “it is also important for the firm to enhance absorptive 
capacities of the suppliers themselves” (Cohendet and Llerena 2005, p.182). This means that a 
contractor does not only assist in the area of cost reduction but also in increasing 
technological competence. The use of external links to extend a firm’s base has thus been 
frequently related to successful innovation. This is particularly important for small 
subcontractors that have to “compensate for small internal resources by being good at 
interacting with the outside world” (Fagerberg 2005, p. 11). Through 43 case studies in Low 
and Medium Tech industries of nine EU countries Hirsch-Kreisen (2008) shows that the 
acquisition and the generation of innovation knowledge rarely takes place within firms but 
relies on external knowledge sources such as customers or machine suppliers.  
Another way to estimate the absorptive capacities of subcontractors is to consider the 
firm’s strategic positioning as a determinant of its ability to learn (Fiol and Lyles 1985). Most 
empirical studies on subcontracting emphasize that cost-driven objectives prevail in all types 
of subcontracting agreements and tend to blur all other objectives. In their qualitative study on 
subcontracting in the aeronautical industry in Quebec, Amesse et al. (2001) show that 
subcontractors perceive all agreements as a result of the main contractor’s cost-driven 
strategy, although the latter is seeking technology transfer. Dyer and Singh (1988) conclude 
that partnering does not differ significantly from arm’s length contracts when cost-driven 
objectives are prevailing. In her study of 18 Finnish subcontractors, Lehtinen (1999) provides 
new evidence. Although she observes an increase of stable commitment-based relationships, 
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partnerships involving integrated R&D processes or mutual sharing strategic visions are still 
very few. Smith and Tranfield (2005), studying the UK aerospace industry, find that new 
subcontracting practices based on lean supply give subcontractors the opportunity to have a 
new status and role. But, their ability for innovation is less apparent: only two subcontractors 
out of ten are engaged in innovation.  
 
To sum up, the few studies that deal with knowledge creation and innovation through 
subcontracting relationships tend to confirm that a new type of subcontractor does exist. 
Theoretically, these “suppliers” differ from traditional subcontractors because of the structure 
of the contractual agreement, the nature of their absorptive capabilities and the inter-
organizational devices by which they are committed to the contractor. However, empirical 
results concerning the supplier’s ability to innovate are still ambiguous. Some studies give 
evidence of the impact of certain practices and tools on innovation, while others are more 
pessimistic, concluding that the so-called “talented suppliers” are an ideal image rather than a 
reality.  
 
2.2. The ability to innovate in process and product  
The clear-cut distinction between product and process innovations has important implications 
for a better understanding of the determinants of innovation and for the competitive position 
of firms (Weiss 2003). Several empirical studies show that product and process innovations 
are closely interlinked in many firms but are driven by different industry and/or firm level 
variables (Vaona and Pianta, 2008, Rouvinen 2002) or organizational capabilities 
(Damampour and Gopalakrishnan 2001). Using the SIEPI-CIS2 database, Vaona and Pianta 
(2008) prove that product and process innovations are present together. In the case of small 
firms, process innovation is reinforced by strategies for production flexibility while product 
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innovation is explained by patenting. After comparing small manufacturing firms in Germany 
and the United Kingdom, White et al. (1988) note that process innovation tends to be 
independent from product innovation when the motive is cost reduction. In contrast, process 
innovation tends to be more related to product innovation when the level or intensity of the 
latter is high or requires similar technical expertise.  
Other empirical studies test if one type of innovation is a driver of the other type or if they 
complement each other. Kraft (1990) shows that product innovation has a significant impact 
on process innovation - but no evidence can be found for the reverse. In contrast, Martinez-
Ros (2000) demonstrates that product and process innovations are complementary after 
checking for the presence of unobserved firm effects like managerial ability, experience, or 
other factors that remain constant during one period. Athey and Schmutzler (1995) show that 
returns on implementing a product innovation are higher when the firm also implements a 
process innovation in the short term. 
Despite the fact that these empirical studies use different methodologies, they show that 
product and process innovations may not be independent choices. The possibility of an 
interaction between the two types of innovations cannot be rejected a priori. Besides, product 
and process innovations are driven by different factors. In the case of subcontracting firms, 
the pattern of interaction between product and process innovations is still unclear. There 
remains important issues: does the “true” potential of collaborative outsourcing have 
consequences for small manufacturers? Is the result a process or a product innovation, or 
both?  
 
3. Method 
In this section, we present the data (3.1), the empirical procedure (3.2) and the variables used 
in this study (3.3).  
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3.1. Data 
Data were collected in May 2007. A specially designed questionnaire was e-mailed to 1126 
companies (with more than 2 employees) operating in “pure subcontracting industries” (Sessi 
2007). All firms are by nature quasi-firms insofar as they are in a state of dependence (more 
or less favourable) regarding their contractors, particularly concerning equipment and car 
manufacturers who constitute the main customer sector. In the sample the share of 
subcontracting activity collected by firms reaches 88%. The size of firms under study matches 
the sector-based data established on a national scale (Sessi, 2007). Over half the 
subcontractors are small (micro) independent firms. Sampled firms are located in the “Sillon 
Alpin”. This region is the biggest industrial subcontracting area in France, employing 25% of 
the people working in the metal cutting and forming sector. 75% of the country’s mechanical 
and bar turning industries are concentrated in this region. In the sample, the biggest majority 
of subcontractors (80,6%) belongs to the metal cutting and forming sector. This sector 
represents the first group of subcontracting activities nationally (Sessi 2007). If firms are 
operating in different activities (Bar Turning, Mechanical, Forge, Stamping, Cutting) and 
supply various industries such as the car industry, they compete in environments that are 
similar in terms of market structure and innovation. Staying dependent from their contractor 
and due to their small size, many firms (especially those with proprietary know-how) should 
be reluctant to participate in inter-firm knowledge-sharing activity.  
Senior managers were asked to provide information about what type of subcontracting 
agreements they had, paying particular attention to the agreement with the most important 
contractor. We obtained details about their degree of dependence, their role in the 
subcontracting relationship and the level of uncertainty they face. Another part of the 
questionnaire was about their ability to innovate in product and process, their organizational 
competencies, their strategic priorities and the different sources of technical knowledge they 
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use to support innovative activities. We collected 93 exploitable questionnaires
5
, and the final 
data is representative of subcontracting firms situated in the “Sillon Alpin” for the 3 sectors 
and the 2 size classes (See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix).  
 
3.2. Empirical procedure 
Subcontracting firms innovate because it is profitable for them to do so (expected returns 
exceed associated costs). Expected profits of an innovator i must be higher with innovation 
(ΠIi) than without innovation (ΠNi), ie: 
 
y
*
i= (ΠIi) -  (ΠNi) > 0          (1) 
 
 
A latent regression can be specified as: 
 
y
*
i = α + β’C XC + β’O XO+ β’S XS + β’SO XSO+ β’CO XCO+ ε     (2) 
 
Where: XC represents the types of subcontracting agreements, XO captures the organizational 
practices and tools stated in the subcontracting firm, XS captures its strategic orientation, XSO 
characterizes the sources of knowledge used to support innovative activities, XCO represents 
the control variables and ε is the error term (assumed to be normally distributed). 
Unfortunately, the subcontractors’ profits with and without innovation cannot be observed. 
We only observe whether it innovates or not. The observed counterpart to y*i is yi, which 
takes a value of 0 (no innovation) or 1 (innovation), noted as follows: 
 
1 if and only if y
*
i > 0  
yi =                (3) 
           0 otherwise 
 
Table 1 indicates that 16 subcontractors (17%) qualify for the title of highly innovating 
firms as they have made innovations in both products and processes in the three years prior to 
the survey. However, estimating the probability to innovate using a probit model is restrictive 
5
 The sampling rate is somewhat small (8%). It can be explained by the strategic nature of the information 
collected and the secrecy policy which is dominant in subcontracting activities.  
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as this supposes that the two processes are independent. As shown before, this hypothesis is 
not adapted because product and process innovations can be linked. It is therefore more 
appropriate to estimate a system of equations rather than separate estimations for each type of 
innovation. 
Table 1. Product and process innovations of subcontractors 
 INOPROC 
INOPROD 0 1 
0 26 29 
1 22 16 
 
For the two types of innovation, process and product, respectively noted j and k, we have: 
 
P(yij=1) = Ф (β’jXij + εij) 
P(yik=1) = Ф (β’kXik + εik)         (4) 
 
Where β is a vector of coefficient, Xi denotes the vector of explanatory variables, and εij and 
εik the error terms which follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean, unit variances 
and ρ is the correlation coefficient of the error terms. We used a bivariate analysis to test the 
correlation between the types of innovation. The test was carried out with a simple t test on 
the ρ coefficient. If ρ is statistically different from zero, the two innovation processes are not 
independent and should not be estimated separately.  
Before presenting the econometric results, we first describe the variables used in the 
regressions (see Table 4). 
 
3.3. Measures 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
By following the Oslow Manual and the Community Innovation Survey, we privilege the 
“subject” approach of innovation (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010). The information is collected 
at the firm-level, including all its innovation outputs and activities. This implies that we do 
not have data on particular innovation projects. Innovation can be classified by basic purpose 
(products and processes) and degree of novelty (new to the firm and/or new to the industry). 
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In this study, we do not differentiate between subcontractors by the intensity of innovation 
since this is mainly incremental in traditional and low-tech industries (De jong and Marsili 
2006). Process innovation (INOPROC) and product innovation (INOPROD) are examined as 
two binary measures of whether or not new or significantly modified production processes or 
products were introduced in the 3 years prior to the survey
6
.  
 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
The covariates used in the regression correspond to the four following series of variables.  
Types of subcontracting agreements. The type of contractual agreement is recorded from 
three dimensions derived from studying the literature (see section 2): the role played by the 
subcontractor in the relationship, the scope and the degree of dependence on its main 
contractor and the level of uncertainty. The operationalization of these dimensions has been 
accomplished with seven core variables used before (see Table 2 hereafter).  
Table 2. Definition of the variables used in the cluster analysis 
Variables Definition 
REAL = 1 if the subcontractor manufactures products only (= 0 otherwise) 
CONCEPT = 1 if the subcontractor participates (even partially) in the development of the products / 
processes (= 0 otherwise) 
NDO = Total number of contractors  
VOLP = Part of the collected subcontracting activity from the main contractor / total volume of 
production of the subcontractor 
CONTRACT = 1 if the contract is written (= 0 otherwise) 
DUREE1 = 1 if the duration of the agreement is less or equal to 1 year (= 0 otherwise) 
RENEG = 1 if the agreement is systematically submitted to renegotiation (= 0 otherwise) 
 
A principal component analysis
7
 (PCA) was conducted on these seven variables. The 
MSA test (Hair et al. 1998) showed that all the variables were good candidates for a PCA 
(MSA values>0.5). In addition, KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity met common standards 
6
 In this study, we adopt an absolute definition of innovation since we consider that all firms are innovative as 
soon as they declare to be innovative. As noted by Freel (2000), the use of a minimum threshold for the share of 
sales attributed to new or modified products/processes would allow us to check the robustness of our results. 
Unfortunately, like many authors that examine the choice between product and/or process innovations (Vaona 
and Pianta 2008; Rouvinen 2002; Martinez-Ros 2000), we do not have such information.  
7
 All these results are available from the author on request. 
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(KMO = 0.55 and p < 0.001). The PCA uncovered three factors that summarize the theoretical 
dimensions well (59.8% of the total explained variance). A non-hierarchical cluster analysis 
was then carried out on the factor scores. To determine the final number of clusters, we used 
three usual criteria: (i) the statistical accuracy of the classification measured by the ratio of 
within and between cluster variances, (ii) the number of firms per cluster, and (iii) the 
economic significance of the clusters identified. According to the criteria, the version with 
two clusters of subcontracting firms was preferred
8
. The variable DUREE1 could not be used 
to describe the profile of clusters as there was no significant effect. This suggests that 
subcontractors (whatever their profile) are placed in similar conditions concerning the 
duration of their agreement. The two clusters can be interpreted as follows (see Table 3):  
In Cluster 1, 41 subcontractors (44.1%) manufacture products only and do not have a free 
hand in product or process development. They are very dependent on their contractors (due to 
the small number of contractors, and the authority of the main one). The presence of arm’s 
length contracts, which are continually in the balance, conforms to traditional subcontracting.  
In Cluster 2, 52 subcontractors (55.9%) participate in product/process conception. 
Subcontractors are linked to a larger number of contractors and the weight of the main 
contractor is weaker than in Cluster 1, although it is still 22% of the total volume of 
production. Contracts are established (written) and are less risky than with traditional 
subcontractors (not systematically renegotiated), which reflects relationships based on trust 
and reciprocity. This type of agreement corresponds more to collaborative outsourcing based 
on incentive schemes as well as routines for the coordination of knowledge and learning 
process.   
The two dummy variables (C1 for traditional subcontracting and C2 for collaborative 
outsourcing) used in the econometric analysis, result from this classification procedure.  
8
 For all comparisons of variances, Fisher’s test is significant at the 0.000 level and indicates a good 
differentiation of the subcontracting firms. 
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Table 3. Interpretation of the two subcontracting clusters 
  NDO VOLP CONTRAT CONCEPT REAL RENEG 
C1: Traditional 
subcontracting 
  
Mean 28.00 37.88 .02 .12 .95 .71 
N 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
C2: Collaborative 
outsourcing 
  
Mean 86.90 22.33 .31 .37 .65 .54 
N 
52 52 52 52 52 52 
Total Mean 60.94 29.18 .18 .26 .78 .61 
Note: We interpret the two clusters (C1 and C2) with the variables used in the cluster analysis. We calculated the 
mean of each variable in each cluster. For example, Traditional subcontractors have fewer customers (28) than 
suppliers (86.9). This table also provides the total number of observations (N) for each cluster. 
 
Organizational practices and tools. To reveal how much integration exists between 
subcontractors and contractors we use two series of variables. The first is related to the 
existence of a shared information system through the use of the EDI network and/or ERP 
applications. The second series of variables aims to identify the presence of practices 
dedicated to the coordination of quality in new forms of subcontracting (Baudry 2003): 
FORM indicates if there are formal agreements between subcontractors and their suppliers or 
contractors, QUALI informs about the adoption of organizational practices centered on 
quality management. LPJAT reveals if subcontractors have implemented a “just-in-time” 
logistical organization.  
Sources of knowledge. Like many authors, we underline the importance of external sources 
of knowledge used by subcontractors as a complement to their internal sources. Four variables 
were used to distinguish external sources from internal ones. The external sources are defined 
as follows: PREST stands for firms that collaborate with external providers to acquire new 
knowledge (private firms specialized or not in R&D and innovation, technical centers, public 
research centers, associations). ACTIFS identifies firms that buy specific assets to innovate 
such as patents, licenses or machines. As far as internal sources are concerned, we distinguish 
firms that rely on their own R&D or engineering departments (BERD) from those that recruit 
new workers or train staff to support their innovative activities (RH). 
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Strategy variables. To complete the specification of the absorptive capabilities of 
subcontractors, we have included a menu of variables related to their strategic objectives. This 
provides the following explanatory variables DEVINOV (development of R&D or 
innovation), RATION (cost-reduction), REDUCDEP (reduction of dependence from 
contractors), DIVER (market diversification). 
Control variables. Two control variables have also been defined: firm size is measured by 
EFF1 (less than 10 employees) and EFF2 (10 employees or more). As far as industrial 
affiliation of subcontractors is concerned, we have undertaken some regrouping inside the 
SIC
9
 four digit level, in order to acknowledge the two main activities of the metal cutting and 
forming sector in the “Sillon Alpin”: bar turning (DEC) and mechanical (MECA). The other 
subcontracting activities are noted as APE2.  
9
 Standard Industrial Classification 
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Table 4. Definition of variables 
Dependent variables Definition 
INOPROC = 1 if the firm has introduced a substantially improved or a completely new process 
in the last three years (= 0 otherwise) 
INOPROD = 1 if the firm has introduced a substantially improved or a completely new product 
in the last three years (=0 otherwise) 
Independent variables Definition 
Subcontracting agreements (Ref. C1= 1 if the type of subcontracting agreement corresponds to traditional 
subcontracting) 
C2 = 1 if the type of subcontracting agreement corresponds to collaborative outsourcing 
(= 0 otherwise) 
Organizational practices and tools 
QUALI =1 if the firm has adopted organizational practices centered on quality management 
such as certification, total productive maintenance, value analysis (= 0 otherwise) 
LPJAT = 1 if the firm has adopted a “just-in-time” logistical organization (= 0 otherwise) 
EDI = 1 if the firm has adopted an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system (= 0 
otherwise) 
ERP = 1 if the firm has adopted an Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) software (= 0 
otherwise) 
EDI_ERP =1 if the firm has adopted an EDI system and an ERP planning software (=0 
otherwise) 
Strategy variables 
DEVINOV = 1 if the firm aims to develop R&D or innovation (= 0 otherwise) 
RATION = 1 if the firm aims to reduce costs (= 0 otherwise) 
RATION_DEV =1 if the firm aims to develop R&D or innovation and aims to reduce costs (=0 
otherwise) 
REDUCDEP = 1 if the firm aims to reduce the dependence from its contractors (= 0 otherwise) 
DIVER = 1 if the firm aims to sell in new markets (= 0 otherwise) 
Sources of knowledge to support innovative activities 
BERD =1 if the firm resorts to its research or production engineering departments to 
innovate (= 0 otherwise) 
PREST = 1 if the firm turns to external providers to innovate (= 0 otherwise) 
ACTIFS = 1 if the firm buys specific assets to innovate (such as patents, licenses, machines) 
(= 0 otherwise) 
RH = 1 if the firm recruits new competences or trains the staff to innovate (= 0 
otherwise) 
Control variables 
Firm size (ref. EFF2= 1 if the firm has 10 employees or more) 
EFF1 = 1 if the firm has less than 10 employees (= 0 otherwise) 
Industrial sector (ref. MECA= 1 if the firm operates in the mechanical industry)  
DEC = 1 if the firm operates in the bar turning industry (= 0 otherwise) 
APE2 = 1 if the firm operates in other pure subcontracting industries (= 0 otherwise) 
 
 
4. Results 
We estimated the system of equations defined in Eq. 4, with a bivariate probit model. As 
regards the robustness of the model, we used White’s procedure (1982) to deal with any 
potential heteroscedasticity problems. The percentage of correct predictions (60.2%) suggests 
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that the model has a good explanatory power compared to the “naïve prediction ratio” of 
25%
10
.  
Table 5. Results of the bivariate probit model. 
 INOPROC-INOPROD 
 INOPROC (yj) INOPROD (yk) Marginal effects 
Variables (x) β σβ β σβ yij=1 ; 
yik=0 
yij=1 ; 
yik=1 
yik=1 ; 
yij=0 
yik=0 ; 
yij=0 
Constant -2.28***      0.95 -0.60    0.78         
C2  0.90**     0.91       0.69**     0.30       0.17  0.18***  0.07 -0.42*** 
QUALI  0.90**     0.40      -0.40     0.37      0.29**  0.04 -0.20 -0.14 
LPJAT  0.05     0.37      0.39     0.32      -0.03  0.05  0.08 -0.10 
EDI -0.29     0.42      0.03     0.41     -0.08 -0.02  0.03  0.07 
ERP  1.95***     0.61      -0.71     0.55      0.50***  0.09 -0.33*** -0.26*** 
EDI_ERP -2.56***    0.94      2.44***     0.82      -0.47*** -0.04  0.70*** -0.18** 
RATION -0.46     0.67     -0.47     0.53     -0.03 -0.14 -0.03  0.21 
DEVINOV -2.31***      0.78      0.11     0.58      -0.54*** -0.18  0.22  0.50 
RATION_DEV  2.67***     0.89      -0.50     0.69      0.48**  0.18 -0.35*** -0.31*** 
REDUCDEP -0.82*     0.45 -0.45     0.37     -0.20 -0.10** -0.06  0.37** 
DIVER -0.90  0.61     -0.25      0.38     -0.16 -0.24**  0.15  0.25*** 
BERD  2.66***     0.38  0.17     0.42       0.34**  0.37*** -0.31*** -0.40*** 
PREST  1.08**     0.44       0.16  0.37       0.20  0.19** -0.13 -0.26*** 
ACTIFS  0.72     0.50       0.72     0.52      -0.02  0.30** -0.02 -0.25*** 
RH  0.46     0.33       0.77**     0.33       0.05  0.13**  0.14 -0.32*** 
EFF1  1.52***     0.43      -0.42  0.33      0.44***  0.10* -0.26*** -0.28** 
DEC  1.02***      0.38       0.26    0.40       0.20  0.18* -0.08 -0.30*** 
APE2  1.63***     0.39       0.46      0.39  0.27**  0.31*** -0.13 -0.44*** 
ρ -0.94** (0.38) 
Number of 
observations 
93 
Log-likelihood - 80.6 
Wald test of ρ 6.01** 
Rate of good 
predictions 
60,2% 
Robust standard errors [using heteroscedastic-consistent errors from White’s procedure] are reported in italics. 
Estimated coefficients are statically different from 0 at 10% (*), at 5% (**), at 1% (***) 
 
The first important result concerns the statistical link between the two innovation choices. 
In Table 5, the correlation coefficient Rho is significantly different from zero suggesting that 
process and product innovations are not independent choices. Thus, the estimation of two 
separate models would lead to a loss of efficiency and possible misleading results (Rouvinen 
2001).  
10
 Four probability scores can be computed P00= probability of no innovation; P01= probability to innovate in 
product only; P10= probability to innovate in process; P11= probability to innovate in process and product. 
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Clearly, product and process innovation are affected by different factors. This confirms 
previous empirical results that make a clear distinction between the two types of innovation: 
process and product innovations only have the type of subcontracting agreement in common. 
As expected, the type of subcontracting agreement explains the ability to innovate of a small 
manufacturer. Suppliers (C2) are more likely to innovate than traditional subcontractors (C1). 
When arrangements are well-established and not systematically renegotiated, and when 
suppliers are invited to play an active role in design, new critical components (trust and 
reciprocity) are introduced that favor their ability to innovate both in product and process. 
As suggested by the knowledge-based perspective, the nature of the contract is not 
sufficient to assess the full role of subcontracting relationships on innovation patterns. Other 
factors such as the presence of organizational practices and tools and the absorptive capacities 
of subcontractors are likely to impact on their ability to innovate. These variables have a 
positive impact on innovation. The likelihood to innovate is higher if subcontractors have 
adopted organizational practices centered on quality management (QUALI) and logistical 
tools (ERP and EDI_ERP). This confirms the importance of the “quality” of integration 
between contractor and subcontractor. However, few variables have a positive effect, meaning 
that innovation capabilities are not necessarily supported by all new practices. This result 
matches the literature on new practices in subcontracting (including lean practices) which 
underline their weak impact on subcontractors’ innovation capabilities. Furthermore, and 
more interestingly, process and product innovations are not affected by the same 
organizational practices or IT tools.  
Process innovation is helped by the presence of quality-oriented practices and ERP 
software while the use of both EDI and ERP (cross variable) diminishes the likelihood to 
innovate in process. In contrast, product innovation depends on the sole combination of both 
EDI and ERP technologies, and is not affected by quality oriented practices. Considering the 
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complementarity between ICT, we note that sharing an information system with a hub firm 
has a positive effect on product innovation and an opposite effect on process innovation. This 
result is in line with recent developments on new forms of subcontracting. The presence of 
such a logistical integration, which is sometimes comparable to an irreversible organizational 
investment, consists of the implementation of a common language between principals and 
subcontractors. What is at stake here is the mutual exchange of complementary forms of 
knowledge between firms for the co-conception of new products. In contrast, process 
innovation is associated with ERP and organizational practices centered on quality 
management mainly aiming for cost reduction. These devices do not concern the 
technological potential of the subcontractor. 
As for the strategic variables, the formulation of a clear objective oriented towards R&D 
or innovation (DEVINOV) decreases the probability to innovate in process. Besides, process 
innovation is explained by a cross effect that measures the pursuit of cost-driven and 
innovation objectives. This result, in line with previous studies, shows that “even when the 
main contractor is concerned by technology transfer, cost-driven actions blur the 
technological objectives of any type of subcontracting agreement” (Amesse et al. 2001, p. 
568). Quite surprisingly, strategic objectives oriented towards R&D and innovation, are not 
positively associated with product innovation. A candidate explanation for this result is that 
product innovation is a never ending improvement process rather than an asserted strategy of 
R&D or new product development. As noted by Pavitt (1984), “competitive success [of small 
specialized suppliers] depends to a considerable degree on firm-specific skills reflected in 
continuous improvements in product design and in product reliability” (p. 359). This 
explanation is strengthened if we consider the sources of knowledge which support the 
innovative activities of subcontractors. The role of firm-specific skills is captured by the 
significant and positive effects of internal R&D and engineering activities (BERD) on process 
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innovation and the recruitment of new competence and staff training on product innovation 
(RH). Though different, the internal sources play a significant role on both types of 
innovation. The significant link between process innovation and BERD is well-explained by 
the fact that small subcontractors in metal manufacturing produce a relatively high proportion 
of their own process technology (Pavitt 1984). Process innovation is also driven by external 
sources of knowledge. This supports the absorption capacity hypothesis (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). In contrast, product innovators solely rely on their main contractor as a source of 
innovation. Following Bruce and Moger (1999), the relationship between supplier and 
contractor seems too close. This reduces the subcontractor’s absorptive capacity and leads to a 
failure to absorb and benefit from external sources of innovation (Pardo and Rama 2009). 
Considering the control variables, sectoral variables are never related to product 
innovation only. The fact that process innovation is significantly associated with APE2 
(rubber and plastic products) matches well the behavior of “science-based” firms. These firms 
innovate both in process and product, with a prevalence of process over product.  
Firms operating in metal manufacturing sectors belong to the cluster of “suppliers of 
intermediate goods” (Archibughi and al. 1991), or “supplier-dominated firms” (De Jong and 
Marsili 2006) which are mainly small process-oriented firms. As observed by these authors, 
micro-firms (from 1 to 9 employees) are over-represented among supplier-dominated firms. 
Finally, the metal cutting and forming sector (that represent more than 80% of the sample) 
refers to important aspects of low-tech industries with specific innovation modes (Hirsch-
Kreinsen 2008). With a high percentage of small firms, innovation is less technology oriented 
than those of High and Medium Tech firms. Though process innovators are innovating 
through external sources, the main customer still appears to be the primary source of 
innovation for most suppliers. Collaborations with external partners such as providers, 
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scientific institutions, specialized consultants, etc. does not appear to be as systematic as it is 
in HMT industries.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Innovation is seen as a crucial factor for the survival and competitive strength of small firms. 
This paper shows that a small subcontractor’s ability to innovate is a complex phenomenon 
driven by multiple influences, including the type of subcontracting agreements, the nature of 
inter-organizational practices and tools, and the “quality” of the subcontractor’s absorptive 
capabilities. Contrary to the majority of studies that focus either on product or process 
innovation, the results indicate that the interaction between the types of innovation themselves 
is also complex since they are not independent choices. The clear-cut distinction between 
product and process innovations in subcontracting relationships leads to important 
conclusions.  
Firstly, this study has revealed the impact of the type of subcontracting agreement on the 
subcontractor’s ability to innovate. Being a supplier rather than a traditional subcontractor 
increases the likelihood of innovation in both process and product. This supports the claim 
that subcontracting relationships are not only a mere practice driven by cost-reduction. Today 
subcontracting relationships are changing as contractual agreements give more scope for 
mutual commitment. This result is in line with the new generation of industrial organization 
theory. Small contractors may move from a dependent status to the category of innovating 
firm by upgrading their own innovation and technology transfer capabilities with, in some 
instances, the help of their main contractors. This result outlines both the role and the 
responsibility of the contractor in relation to the future of traditional subcontractors and their 
survival. Bearing in mind that 44.1% of subcontractors operate in uncertain conditions and 
with strong dependence, it is not surprising that these subcontractors are less committed to 
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innovation than suppliers since their contractual arrangements provide per se no incentive to 
innovate. 
Secondly, we have shown that subcontractors differ according to the type of innovation. 
Process innovation is supported by the pursuit of two objectives: cost reduction and 
innovation. Furthermore, subcontractors are more likely to innovate in process when their 
activities have been integrated with their contractors in quality and information sharing 
(QUAL and ERP). But, this operational integration is circumscribed to a dyadic relationship 
to foster process innovation. In contrast, product innovation is influenced by EDI and ERP 
tools that play a crucial role in the sharing of information and diffusion of innovation in a 
network-organization. We also give evidence that product and process innovations are not 
affected by the same sources of knowledge. In the case of process innovation, subcontractors 
are more likely to innovate in process if they use formal R&D and other lower sources of 
technical knowledge such as engineering and external providers. Product innovation is 
strengthened by the recruitment of new competence and staff training. The fact that external 
providers do not affect product innovation means that subcontractors rely heavily on the sole 
understanding of the contractors’ need to innovate. Even though we must remain cautious, it 
seems that product innovation is more likely to emerge in a network-organization under the 
control of the prime contractor. In this case, relationships that are too close may be a 
substitute rather than a complementary source to the innovation process, with some risks of 
lock-in for the supplier. Consistent with Nobeoka et al. 2002, one main challenge for 
subcontractors is to lessen their dependence by enlarging their customer scope once they 
strengthen their own innovation capabilities.  
Thirdly, the firms’ characteristics and innovation modes in pure subcontracting industries 
are very close to those found in Low-Tech industries. Subcontractors are mostly process 
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innovators showing that cost-minimization and flexibility are still major sources of 
competitiveness for most small subcontracting firms.  
The results of this explanatory research suggest further issues for policy makers and 
theoretical implications. In France, the setting up of “competitiveness clusters” is an attempt 
to bridge the innovation gap of small firms, and new public policies are being implemented to 
help subcontractors to innovate. However, although these policies are useful, they often miss 
their goal. They are too often directed at subcontractors (without differentiating them) or 
certain contractors (the most involved), so neglecting the relationship itself. It is time that 
policy makers recognize that the ability of a subcontractor to innovate depends on the nature 
of the subcontracting relationship and requires an alignment of their organizational practices 
and tools (Van Echtelt et al. 2008). Any attempt to bring a contractor close to its 
subcontractors might prove a useful step to create true partnership relations based on shared 
representations. The study shows that the theoretical model of partnership described by the 
knowledge-based perspective is still a distance from its practical expression in pure 
subcontracting industries.  
The significant and positive impact of internal sources of knowledge on innovation is 
another key point in this study. As pointed out by Freel and Harrison (2006), internal 
resources are crucial and “networking is neither a sufficient nor, even, a necessary condition 
for innovation” (Op. Cit, p. 301). This conclusion is strengthened in the case of collaborative 
outsourcing if the potential of innovation of the subcontractors is looked for. We think that 
policy makers should develop the internal learning and absorptive capabilities of 
subcontractors. Some initiatives have already been conducted in this way. For instance, to 
compensate for resource and capability shortages of micro-firms, diverse forms of groupings 
have been initiated. These allow firms to propose global solutions to customers relying on 
their complementarities. Nevertheless, these policy initiatives are not sufficient because they 
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neglect the most vulnerable subcontractors: the small traditional ones. Moreover, they fail to 
motivate a personal interest to participate in collective projects and to openly share their 
knowledge with other members. 
Finally, we acknowledge that there are some limitations to our study. Firstly, the 
specificity of the population studied reduces the number of observations. But it also has the 
advantage that firms are relatively homogeneous. Innovation in pure subcontracting industries 
has rarely been a subject of interest even though it helps to better understand firms’ 
competitiveness in low-tech industries. It would be interesting to confront these results with 
data from regions in other countries which still depend on these particular industries since this 
question has important implications for their future competitiveness. Secondly, we have to 
stress the limitation of an innovation survey to capture the impact of shared knowledge (that is 
intrinsically social and collective) on outsourcing performance (Blumenberg et al. 2009). 
Following the same methodology as the one chosen by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000), it would be 
interesting to highlight the quantitative results with qualitative data coming from interviews 
with contractors and subcontractors belonging to the same network. This would make it 
possible to distinguish the nature of the shared knowledge during the relation process 
(relation-specific knowledge versus redeployable knowledge) since it does not have the same 
impact on the suppliers’ performance (Nobeoka et al., 2002). Thirdly, our study is a static 
cross-sectional analysis. Changes in the subcontracting relationships over time, underlying 
strategic and management processes as well as their impact on innovation cannot be 
identified. The analysis of project-related processes to manage supplier involvement (Van der 
Valk and Wynstra 2005) could be a complementary way of research. Lastly, we know that 
because of its cost-cutting nature, process innovation may have ambiguous effects on a firm’s 
growth (Fagerberg 2005). Further research is needed to assess the impact of process and 
product innovations on subcontractors’ competitive position.  
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Appendix: Data descriptives 
 
Table A1. Firms’ Industrial affiliation (SIC: 4 –digit) 
 Parent population Sample 
Subcontracting industries N (%) n (%) 
Metal cutting and forming 870 (77,3) 75 (80,6) 
Bar Turning (28.5) 298 (26,5) 33 (35,5) 
Mechanical (28.5) 355 (31,5) 24 (25,8) 
Forge, stamping,  cutting (28.4) 217 (19,3) 18 (19,4) 
Other subcontracting industries: Plastic and 
rubber  
Technical parts made of plastic (25.2), Moulds 
and models (29.5), Springs and manufacturing 
of other rubber items (25.1).   
256 (22,7) 18 (19,4) 
Total 1126 (100,0) 93 (100,0) 
 
Table A2. Firms’ size 
 Parent population Sample 
Size N (%) n (%) 
Less than 10 employees 498 (44,2) 48 (51,6) 
From 10 to 50 employees 505 (44,8) 38 (40,9) 
More than 50 employees 123 (10,9) 7 (7,5) 
Total 1126 (100,0) 93 (100,0) 
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics (%) 
Variables Full sample INOPROC INOPROD 
Clusters of subcontractors 
C1 44.1 31.7 34.1 
C2 55.9 59.6 48.1 
Organizational practices and tools 
QUALI 60.2 58.9 42.8 
LPJAT 30.1 53.6 53.6 
EDI 19.4 38.9 55.6 
ERP 18.3 58.8 41.2 
Strategy variables 
DEVINOV 38.7 44.4 47.2 
RATION 72.0 53.7 35.8 
REDUCDEP 28.0 42.3 38.5 
DIVER 84.9 38.7 40.5 
Sources of knowledge supporting innovative activities 
BERD 22.6 76.2 54.0 
PREST 23.7 63.6 45.5 
ACTIFS 14.0 53.8 53.8 
RH 60.2 58.2 50.9 
Control variables 
EFF1 51.6 43.8 33.3 
EFF2 48.4 53.3 48.9 
DEC 35.4 51.6 39.4 
APE2 38.7 55.6 50 
MECA 25.9 33.0 29.2 
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